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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first econometric 
investigation into the role of television in the formation of political consensus in Italy. 
Based on probit and instrumental variables estimates, we find trust in television to be 
the most significant predictor of trust in the Italian prime minister. The latter is also 
strongly and negatively correlated with trust in the judicial system and tolerance 
towards immigrants. 
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1. Introduction 
Silvio Berlusconi has dominated Italian political life since he was first elected prime minister in 
1994. He is now in his third term, although the terms were not consecutive. He is the second 
longest-serving prime minister of Italy, after Benito Mussolini, and, as of May 2011, he is the 
longest-serving current leader of a G8 country. This political longevity is often difficult to 
understand for foreign political analysts. The Italian prime minister has an extensive record of 
criminal allegations, including mafia collusion, false accounting, tax fraud, corruption and bribery 
of police officers and judges5. Recently, he has even been charged with child prostitution. In a 
famous editorial published ten years ago in April 2001, respected British newsmagazine The 
Economist stated that: “In any self-respecting democracy it would be unthinkable that the man 
assumed to be on the verge of being elected prime minister would recently have come under 
investigation for, among other things, money-laundering, complicity in murder, connections with 
the Mafia, tax evasion and the bribing of politicians, judges and the tax police”6. According to The 
Economist, one of the main explanations of Mr Berlusconi’s political success is his exceptional grip 
on Italy’s media. “Through his Mediaset empire, he controls most of Italian private television. As 
prime minister, he indirectly controls Italian public service television (Radio Televisione Italiana, 
RAI), giving him influence over some 90% of Italian TV”7. The media power that Berlusconi has 
built his empire on is indeed unimaginable in any other western democracy8. 
Not surprisingly, rightist opinion leaders argue that television does not influence political opinion. 
This view is widespread in the Italian political debate and leads commentators to affirm that, even if 
Italians are well aware of Mr Berlusconi’s criminal allegations as well as of his personal and 
political limitations, they actually trust the prime minister because they feel a deep affinity with 
him. This argument implies that Mr Berlusconi’s political success is not specifically related to the 
power of his media empire to bias public opinion. If the assumption of television’s irrelevance was 
true, one could reasonably expect to find no significant individual-level relationship between trust 
in television and trust in the Italian prime minister. 
So far it has been impossible to carry out an econometric test of this thesis. The most 
comprehensive Italian surveys are conducted by public institutions, such as the National Bureau of 
Statistics and the Bank of Italy, which cannot collect information on interviewees’ political 
preferences. On the other hand, political opinion polls carried out by private agencies cannot 
administer excessively long questionnaires able to collect comprehensive data on the social and 
economic background of respondents.  
                                                 
5 The mafia prosecution was dropped due to the expiration of statutory terms for preliminary inquiry (see for example 
Ginsborg 2005). False accounting prosecution was dropped because of a law passed by Berlusconi’s parliamentary 
majority that made false accounting illegal only if a specific damaged party reports the fact to the authorities (see for 
example Blondel and Segatti 2003). For bribery of judges and tax evasion, charges were dropped because the statute of 
limitations had expired (see for example Warner 2007). Trials for bribery, corruption and child prostitution are currently 
in progress (see for example Center for the Study of Democracy 2010).  
6
The Economist, “An Italian story”, published in the issue of April 28th 2001. This issue the cover title: “Why Silvio 
Berlusconi is unfit to lead Italy” and provoked a heated debate in Italy. In July 2001 Mr Berlusconi launched a lawsuit 
in Italy alleging that The Economist had defamed him in the article. The court in Milan has issued a judgment rejecting 
all of Mr Berlusconi’s claims and requiring him to make a payment for costs to The Economist. Mr Berlusconi’s 
lawyers have announced that he will appeal. 
7
The Economist, “Mamma mia. Italians may come to regret electing Silvio Berlusconi once again”, published on April 
17th 2008. 
8 It must be remembered that RAI has never been an independent public service broadcaster, since it has always been 
subject to the distribution of posts and power according to political affiliation. As head of the government, Berlusconi 
has de facto power to appoint the managers of RAI and the directors of the majority of RAI’s information and 
entertainment broadcasts. RAI channels have traditionally been divided along political lines. RAI 1 and RAI 2are 
relatively centre right and currently give manifest support to Mr Berlusconi’s government. RAI 3, the most independent 
channel of the public broadcasting system (PBS), is commonly viewed as the opposition channel (Brevini 2010). 
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In this paper, we use a unique dataset to carry out the first econometric investigation into the 
relationship between trust in television and trust in the Italian prime minister. Raw data were 
collected through the administration of a questionnaire to a representative sample (n = 817) of the 
population of the Italian Province of Trento in March 2011. The sample was stratified by age, 
gender and area of residence. The questionnaire was specifically designed for the evaluation of  
individuals’ values, beliefs and behaviours, along with a wide range of relevant socio-demographic 
and economic characteristics9.  
Our dependent variable is measured through the question: “Do you think that the prime minister can 
be trusted?”. Interviewees were asked to give a score from 1 to 10 for their trust, 1 meaning “Not at 
all” and 10 meaning “Totally”. The main independent variable is trust in television, as measured by 
the score from 1 to 10 given by respondents to the question: “Do you think that television can be 
trusted?”. 
Probit and ordered logit estimates clearly show that trust in television is the most significant 
predictor of trust in the prime minister and that this finding is robust to different specifications. 
However, there are three reasons for which this result could be interpreted as the fruit of a spurious 
correlation. First, it is difficult to distinguish the effect of trust in television from that of other 
phenomena that potentially influence trust in the prime minister. To deal with this problem, we 
include in the trust equation a wide set of individual and household control variables. We place a 
special focus on the possible role of social capital, which is traditionally claimed to play a role in 
making democracy work at the community level. Specifically, we account for multiple indicators of 
both structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital. Second, individual effects, such as 
individuals’ exogenous shocks, may be correlated with trust both towards television and the prime 
minister, thus creating a common bias. Third, it is reasonable to assume the existence of reverse 
causality: Mr Berlusconi’s television empire has helped shape the country’s imagination over a 
generation, and the prime minister invites citizens to trust his media. To deal with the last two 
problems, we turn to instrumental variables (IV) estimates.  
When we address endogeneity in IV estimates, trust in television remains the best (most significant 
and strongest) predictor of trust in the prime minister. Interestingly, trust in the press is not an 
explanatory variable. Social capital variables are also found to be irrelevant. Certain categories of 
self-employed workers – i.e. farmers and members of professions – are found to be more likely to 
trust the prime minister. By contrast, we find that the dependent variable is significantly and 
negatively correlated with trust in the judicial system and with a measure of tolerance towards 
immigrants.  
Even if these results pass robustness checks and hold in IV estimates, it must be remarked that the 
cross-sectional design of the research dictates extreme caution in the interpretation of correlations 
as causal relationships. Nonetheless, the paper contributes to the literature by carrying out the first 
econometric investigation into the role of television in individuals’ political opinions, with a focus 
on trust towards the Italian prime minister. The relationship between television and political 
attitudes and beliefs is an important topic for economics, in view of the unquestionable role that 
political institutions, particularly the government and the prime minister, play in a country’s 
economic performance (Besley and Burgess 2002; Connolly and Hargreaves Heap 2007). However, 
this topic is largely neglected in the literature. This paper aims to take a step in filling that gap. The 
use of a unique and very recent (March 2011) dataset collected in a region traditionally 
characterized by efficient public institutions and very contained inequalities adds further value to 
the analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and our 
empirical strategy. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the estimates. Concluding remarks 
and a brief discussion of policy implications close the paper. 
                                                 
9 The questionnaire was administered through computer assisted telephone interviewing by the Technical Unit of the 
Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento.   
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2. Data and empirical strategy 
Our dependent variable is given by responses to the question: “Do you think that the prime minister 
can be trusted?”. Interviewees were asked to give a score from 1 to 10 for their trust, 1 meaning 
“Not at all” and 10 meaning “Totally”. We followed the approach to code 1 for responses above 6. 
Still, all results presented in this paper are robust to a different specification of the dependent 
variable in which responses above the mean value are coded 1. It must be stated that interviewers 
did not explicitly mention the name of Silvio Berlusconi. So, it is theoretically possible that some 
respondents’ answers referred to the institution of the presidency of the council of ministers, rather 
than to the person of the prime minister. However, the questionnaire was administered in March 
2011, when the man and his institutional office were virtually indistinguishable. In our view, in the 
context of the contemporary Italian political arena, the assumption that the above-mentioned 
responses can be used to score citizens’ trust towards Mr Berlusconi is reasonably reliable.  
Trust in television is measured by the score from 1 to 10 given by respondents to the question: “Do 
you think that television can be trusted?”, 1 meaning “Not at all” and 10 meaning “Totally”. 
Our choice to focus on the Province of Trento was due to results from recent empirical studies 
which found the territory to be characterized by contained inequalities, efficient public institutions, 
and above average levels of material and subjective well-being (Degli Antoni 2006, 2009; Fiorillo 
2008; Sabatini 2008, 2009a; Villa and Zola 2008). Administratively, the Province enjoys a large 
degree of autonomy in the following sectors: health, education, welfare and transport infrastructure.  
In our view, these characteristics do not imply a particular bias in terms of political opinions. More 
in particular, we argue it is not possible to establish whether the traditionally well-known efficiency 
of local public institutions could reinforce trust towards the Italian prime minister as an institution 
in himself, since the Province has been governed by centrist or centre-leftist coalitions for a long 
time. Overall, results from past elections suggest that political opinions of the Trentino Region’s10 
population seem not to be particularly biased in favour Mr Berlusconi’s party (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix).  
 
2.1 Probit estimates 
In Model 1 we control for a number of socio-demographic and economic characteristics (see 
column 1 in Table 2). At the household level, the analysis accounts for a measure of economic well-
being given by responses to the question: “Is your household’s income sufficient to see you through 
to the end of the month?”. Respondents were asked to give a score from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
“With great difficulty” and 5 meaning “Very easily”. We coded 1 for negative responses (i.e. “With 
great difficulty” and “With difficulty”) and used the label “Poor” to indicate the dichotomous 
variable in regressions. Robustness checks were performed by replacing this measure with two 
other indicators of economic well-being. The first is given by responses to the question: “How 
would you place your household income in respect to the average income of Italian households?”. 
Respondents were asked to give a score from 1 to 5, 1 meaning “Much below the average” and 5 
meaning “Much above the average”. The second measure of economic well-being used in 
robustness checks is given by responses to the question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with your 
economic situation?”. Once again, interviewees were asked to give a score from 1 to 10, with 1 
meaning “Not at all” and 10 meaning “Totally satisfied”. 
At the individual level, the analysis accounts for the following control variables: 
- Education, treated as an ordinal variable where each category corresponds to a degree of 
educational qualification. Results do not change if we include dummy variables corresponding to 
each level of qualification. 
                                                 
10 Hereafter we will use “Province of Trento” and “Trentino Region” as synonyms.  
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- Work status, as indicated by a number of dummies reporting whether the interviewee is a blue-
collar worker, office worker, teacher, managerial employee, member of profession, entrepreneur, 
farmer, pensioner, homemaker, or unemployed. Students are the omitted category in regressions.  
- Usual socio-demographic controls such as gender, being in a stable relationship, age, and the area 
of residence (urban vs. rural). 
All the variables are described in detail in Table A1 in Appendix A. Summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1.  
The measurement of social capital is a delicate and controversial issue which we prefer not to 
discuss here. For a comprehensive survey of methodological problems in the empirical literature on 
social capital, we refer the reader to the reviews in Fine (2001, chapter 10), Durlauf and Fafchamps 
(2005) and Sabatini (2007, 2009a, 2009c). In model 2, we account for the “structural”  
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Trust in the Italian prime minister 754 .229443 .4207537 
Trust in television 817 .5911873 .4919157 
Membership of associations 817 .3206854 .467026 
Number of associations 817 .5446756 .9565431 
Volunteer unpaid work for associations 817 .2729498 .4457481 
Help to strangers within volunteering activities 817 .2056304 .4044091 
Participation in associational meetings 817 .2888617 .4535111 
Social trust 817 .4247246 .4946039 
Trust in the judicial system 817 .621787 .4852382 
Tolerance towards non EU immigrants 817 .7380661 .4399562 
Tolerance towards EU immigrants 817 .8567931 .3504982 
Tolerance towards drug or alcohol addicts 817 .4381885 .4964686 
Age 35-49 817 .2949816 .4563139 
Age 50-64 817 .2325581 .4227216 
Age 65 and more 817 .2362301 .4250254 
Female 817 .5165239 .500033 
Being in a stable relationship 817 .7172583 .4506078 
Educational qualification (ordinal) 817 4.452876 1.48375 
Precarious worker 817 .0110159 .104441 
Blue-collar worker 817 .122399 .3279469 
Office worker 817 .2264382 .4187823 
Teacher 817 .0428397 .2026195 
Managerial employee 817 .0183599 .1343311 
Member of professions 817 .0403917 .1969967 
Entrepreneur 817 .0146879 .1203739 
Farmer 817 .0403917 .1969967 
Unemployed 817 .0269278 .1619716 
Retired 817 .2594859 .4386211 
Homemaker 817 .0832313 .2764008 
Area or residence (urban vs. rural) 817 .3561812 .479163 
Poor 817 .1505508 .3578295 
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dimensions of the concept. The structural dimension deals with individuals’ behaviours and can 
take the form of relational goods consumption, participation in social networks, and volunteering 
activities. Cognitive social capital deals with agents’ perceptions and involves concepts such as 
trust, reciprocity, and shared beliefs (Uphoff 1999). 
In this paper, we measure structural social capital through membership of voluntary organizations, 
as given by a number of indicators capturing: 
- the number of associations in which the interviewee participates, both through a formal 
membership or through informal participatory activities. 
- The type of association, as measured by a number of dummy variables. In particular, the analysis 
includes cultural, recreational, health and assistance, advocacy, environmental and religious 
associations. 
- Attendance at associational meetings, measured through a binary variable coded 1 if the 
respondent had joined meetings in the last 12 months before the interview. 
- Volunteering, measured through a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent had done unpaid 
volunteer work in the last 12 months before the interview. 
- Altruism, measured through a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent had concretely helped 
strangers within her volunteering activities in the last 12 months before the interview. 
In model 3 we add measures of cognitive social capital, as given by two indicators of social trust 
and trust towards the institutions, and three indicators of “tolerance”. Social trust was measured 
through the standard trust question, “In general, do you think most people can be trusted or can’t 
you be too careful?”, conceived by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and introduced to large U.S. surveys 
by Rosenberg (1956). Institutional trust is measured through the scores from 1 to 10 given by 
responses to the question “Do you that the judicial system can be trusted?”, with 1 meaning “Not at 
all” and 10 meaning “Totally”. In both cases responses were recoded 1 if their value was above the 
mean. 
In principle, it could be argued that at the community level a vibrant social environment which 
allows people to meet frequently and to share information, opinions and experience might scale 
down the role of mass media in the formation of political preferences. Indeed it seems somewhat 
significant that the Province of Trento, which according to previous studies enjoys an exceptional 
wealth of community social capital (Sabatini 2008, 2009b), has always exhibited a relatively 
moderate consensus for the prime minister’s party. However, as column 2 of Table 2 reports, most 
social capital variables are found to be irrelevant at the individual level. 
Tolerance was measured through the question: “Which of these categories of people would you be 
willing to have as neighbours”, where categories were non EU immigrants, EU immigrants, alcohol 
or drug addicts, and people who declare themselves to be racist.  
 
2.2 Instrumental variables estimates 
As will be reported in section 3, probit estimates clearly show that trust in television is the most 
significant predictor of trust in the prime minister, and that this result is robust to different 
specifications. However, as we mentioned in the introduction, individual effects or other unknown 
phenomena which we may not be able to account for within the model could be correlated with both 
the dependent variable and the main regressor, thus creating a common bias. Moreover, there are 
reasons to suspect the existence of reverse causality: Mr Berlusconi owns or controls the majority of 
the Italian broadcasting system, so it is reasonable to argue that trusting Mr Berlusconi may also 
lead citizens to trust his television channels. After a simple regression-based test of endogeneity, we 
deal with this issue by means of instrumental variables (IV) estimates.  
In IV estimates, we use two individual-level instruments for trust in television given by the quality 
of friendships and trust in the press. As the tests reported in section 3 show, these variables satisfy 
the two necessary conditions for instrument validity, since they are both strongly correlated with 
trust in television (“relevance” condition) and they are both orthogonal to the disturbance term of 
the trust in the prime minister equation (“orthogonality” condition). 
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The quality of friendships is measured through individuals’ reported satisfaction with relationships 
with friends, as given by responses to the question: “How satisfied do you feel with your 
relationships with friends?”. 
The relationship between television, relational goods and life satisfaction has already been analyzed 
in the literature (Putnam 1995; Corneo 2005; Bruni and Stanca 2006, 2008; Frey et al. 2007). 
Drawing on data from the first wave of the European Social Survey, Frey et al. (2007) find that 
watching TV is positively related to people’s material aspirations and negatively related to their 
trust in others as well as to relative frequency of social activities. Bruni and Stanca (2006, 2008) use 
data from the World Values Survey to show that television viewing plays a key role in reducing 
happiness through two main mechanisms. First, it crowds-out relationality (Bruni and Stanca 2008). 
Second, it contributes to raising individual material aspirations, thus lowering the effect of higher 
income on happiness (Bruni and Stanca 2006). Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini (2011a, 2011b) show 
that under certain conditions the crowding out hypothesis can be generalized to various kinds of 
technology-intensive consumption, with an exception made for the Internet.  
It must be stated that, in respect to the above mentioned literature, in this paper we measure trust in 
television instead of viewing TV. This difference is critical to the purpose of our study for two main 
reasons. First, as stated by Frey et al. (2007), subjective time use data may be inaccurate or biased: 
“Watching television might not be understood in the same way by all respondents, and they might 
not differentiate between television viewing as primary, secondary or even tertiary activity. 
Respondents might not even correctly remember all the times they were watching television” (p. 
290). Moreover, people may watch television without trusting the reliability of its contents. For 
example, spectators of reality shows are often aware that characters are actually following a script, 
but they are likely to enjoy the show even if they do not trust its “reality” at all.  
Moreover, we refer to relational goods in terms of their quality, rather than to the mere frequency of 
their consumption. Friendship is a qualitative concept which cannot be measured just through the 
frequency of meetings with friends. Following Diener and Seligman (2002), in this paper we use 
satisfaction with relationships with friends as a proxy for the “quality” of friendship. The quality of 
relationships with friends has been found to be strongly associated with aspects of well-being such 
as happiness (Baldassarre et al. 1984; Argyle 1987; Myers 1999;Deci and Ryan 2001; Diener and 
Seligman 2002; Lyubomirsky et al. 2006; Demir and Weitenkamp 2007; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2008; Sabatini 2011) and health (Fiorillo and Sabatini 2011). Drawing on a sample of 
222 undergraduate students, Diener and Seligman (2002) find that the subjective rating of 
relationships with close friends is the best predictor of happiness. Demir et al. (2007) use a sample 
of 280 college students to analyze the role of best and close friendships in happiness. The authors 
find that best friendship quality – as measured by the subjective rating of respondents’ relationships 
with their best friends – is the only significant predictor of happiness. 
In the population object of our investigation, the frequency of contact with friends exhibits a weak 
and positive correlation with trust in television11. By contrast, the quality of friendships is found to 
be significantly and negatively correlated with trust in TV by probit and first stage IV estimates. 
Arguably, satisfactory relationships which entail mutual trust as well as the exchange of ideas and 
information may reduce the role of television in the obtaining of social and political information, 
thereby preventing individuals from uncritically evaluating broadcasting contents. The significance 
of the correlation, along with the tests of the joint significance of coefficients carried out in section 
3 (see Tables 3 and 4), support the assumption that this variable is a relevant instrument.  
As for the orthogonality condition, it must be stated that several studies find the quality of 
friendships to be correlated with certain domains of trust, such as social trust. However, the latter 
concept is extremely different from the dependent variable we use in the empirical analysis. In 
support of the hypothesis of orthogonality, probit and ordered logit regressions do not find any 
significant correlation between the quality of friendships and trust in the Italian prime minister.  
                                                 
11 Estimates are available upon request to the author. 
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The other instrument we use in the analysis, i.e. trust in the press, may be subject to greater 
contention. One could argue that people who trust the press are not likely to behave and think so 
differently from those who trust television. Indeed we find the two variables to be significantly 
correlated in our sample through probit estimates and first stage IV estimates (p value = 0.000). The 
test of the joint significance of coefficients (see Tables 3 and 4) also supports the assumption that 
this variable satisfies the relevance condition. However, this correlation does not imply that trust in 
television and trust in the press are able to bias political opinions to the same extent and in the same 
direction.  
There are at least three reasons to suspect that the orthogonality condition might be satisfied. First, 
television and the press are very different media. As stated by Frey et al. (2007), “TV viewing is 
characterized by immediate benefits and negligible immediate marginal costs. One just has to push 
a button” (p. 287, italic is ours). By contrast, reading the press requires an active and mindful 
choice of newspaper, as well as the act of going to a kiosk and paying for the purchase. Compared 
to reading newspapers, watching TV has virtually no entry barriers, especially in the case of 
television channels owned or controlled by Mr Berlusconi (Mediaset and public service channels 
can be viewed free of charge). Moreover, as reported by Frey et al. (2007), there is anecdotal 
evidence that individuals may have self-control problems in watching television: it is hardly 
arguable that the activity of reading newspapers can cause similar problems.  
Second, newspaper readers are far fewer in number than TV viewers (Istat 2008). Thus, people who 
report that they trust the press are not necessarily habitual readers. By contrast, people who trust TV 
are more likely to be habitual watchers. Overall, in Italy the press is a less influential and pervasive 
media than the television. 
Third, the Italian press is much more pluralist than Italian television. Mr Berlusconi’s family 
directly owns “only” a small number of newspapers and several magazines, not the majority12. 
Overall, it is possible to state that Italian newspapers more or less equally represent all political 
views. Thus, trust in the press cannot be correlated with a definite bias in terms of trust or distrust 
towards the prime minister. Moreover, local newspapers published in the Province of Trento are 
traditionally moderate and try to remain equidistant from political alignments.  
In light of the arguments discussed above and of the estimates carried out within the empirical 
analysis, it seems reasonable to assume that, in the population under investigation, there is no direct 
link between trust in the press and trust in the prime minister. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, we 
test the validity of our instruments with over-identification tests presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Our empirical model of trust in the Italian prime minister can be represented through the following 
estimation equation: 
ititititit ZSCTVSB εδγβα ++++=
'''*                                                       (1) 
where SB is trust in the prime minister for individual i at time t, TV is trust in television, SC are the 
social capital variables (both structural and cognitive) defined at the individual level, the Z vector 
                                                 
12 Berlusconi owns Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, the largest Italian publishing house which owns over 50 magazines, 
including Panorama, one of the country’s most popular news magazines, and Chi, and TV Sorrisi e Canzoni, two of the 
most popular tabloids. His brother, Paolo Berlusconi, owns and operates il Giornale, a right wing newspaper which 
provides a strong pro-Berlusconi slant on Italy and its politics. Il Foglio, one of the most influential Italian right-wing 
newspapers, is partially owned by his former wife, Veronica Lario. As for television, the Italian prime minister owns 
three of the seven national terrestrial televisions, i.e. Canale Cinque, Italia Uno and Rete Quattro, he holds a minority 
stake in La 7 and, as head of the government, he has de facto power to control the three country’s public television 
channels, i.e. Rai 1, Rai 2 and Rai 3. Overall, he is in a position to influence more than 90% of the country's television 
output. 
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consists of the other variables that may influence trust in the prime minister, and ε is a random-error 
term. 
We do not observe the “latent” variable *itSB  in the data. Rather, we observe itSB as a binary 
variable which takes the value 1 if *itSB  takes values over 6 and 0 otherwise. Thus, the structure of 
(1) makes it suitable for estimation as a probit model: 
)-SC-TV-()1Pr( 'it
''
it δγβα itit ZSB Φ==                                                     (2) 
 
Table 2. Probit estimates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect. 
t stat. 
Trust in television .1221223      4.19   .121433       4.17   .163775      5.44   
Structural social capital     
Membership of associations   -.016752      -0.15    .00572      0.05   
Number of associations   -.008192      -0.26    -.013603      -0.43   
Volunteer unpaid work for associations   .081718      0.79    .074366      0.73   
Help to strangers within volunteering activities   -.035951    -0.64    -.013694      -0.25   
Participation in associational meetings   -.012335   -0.11    -.016904      -0.17   
Cognitive social capital    
Social trust     .023262   0.64   
Trust in the judicial system     -.066084 -1.88   
Tolerance towards non EU immigrants     -.082413      -1.63   
Tolerance towards EU immigrants     -.097133      -1.56   
Tolerance towards drug or alcohol addicts     -.019794      -0.60   
Demographic, social and economic characteristics     
Age 35-49 -.001951      -0.04   -.000595      -0.01   .009243     0.18   
Age 50-64 -.063654      -1.16   -.062013       -1.13   -.033643       -0.59   
Age 65 and more -.094093      -1.54   -.093188      -1.52   -.078107      -1.26   
Female -.041786      -1.24   -.042057      -1.24   -.023448      -0.70   
Being in a stable relationship -.031322      -0.81   -.032415      -0.83   -.032461      -0.83   
Educational qualification (ordinal) -.051397       -5.84   -.051832      -5.72   -.030242      -3.00   
Precarious worker .029832      0.18   .032712      0.19   .091561      0.48   
Blue-collar worker -.029190      -0.47   -.026524       -0.43   -.020346      -0.33   
Office worker -.063411      -1.05   -.060772      -1.00   -.04892      -0.80   
Teacher -.026763      -0.26   -.021731      -0.21   -.039327      -0.42   
Managerial employee .190955      1.20   .185009      1.16   .186922       1.18   
Member of professions .213090     1.77   .219489      1.81   .255212      2.03   
Entrepreneur .03321     0.19   .020350      0.12   .056658      0.33   
Farmer .209372      1.76   .217122      1.82   .23481      1.89   
Unemployed -.038612      -0.41   -.038335       -0.40   -.041619       -0.45   
Retired .081971      0.96   .082864     0.97   .105075       1.18   
Homemaker .018582       0.21   .022775      0.26   .037979      0.41   
Area or residence (urban vs. rural) -.052349        -1.64   -.052472      -1.62   -.039295      -1.21   
Poor .0561422      1.19   .053071      1.13   .048195       1.03   
Omitted categories are: “Age 18-34” and “Students”. 
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where Ф(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a normal standard. 
Table 2 presents the results of the probit estimates. To compare relative magnitudes of the effects of 
the independent variables, we report their marginal effects. In model 1 (column 1 of Table 2), we 
principally focus on trust in television and on a number of covariates representing individual socio-
demographic and economic characteristics. Trust in television is found to be the strongest predictor 
of trust in the prime minister. More precisely, people who trust television exhibit a 12 percentage 
point higher likelihood of also trusting Mr Berlusconi. Trust in the prime minister is significantly 
and negatively correlated with education.  
When education is measured as an ordinal variable, the size effect of each category is significantly 
lower than that of trust in TV. On the other hand, if we replace the ordinal variable with a number 
of dummies representing each type of qualification provided by the Italian education system, the 
significance, sign and size of the role of TV do not change, and we observe slight changes in the 
size effect across the different qualifications13.  
These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables. The more we add 
covariates to the model, the more the role of trust in television grows in significance and size. 
In models 2 and 3 we add indicators of structural and cognitive social capital. Trust in TV is 
confirmed as the most significant regressor, with a size effect increasing to about 15%. Social 
capital variables seem to be irrelevant, with the exception of the indicator of trust towards the 
judicial system, which is found to be significantly and negatively correlated with trust towards the 
prime minister. This is not surprising, since Mr Berlusconi always claims to be the victim of a 
manifest judicial persecution. The Italian prime minister frequently refers to the judicial system as a 
cancer – and to single judges as “metastases” – in public discourses. People who trust the judicial 
system report an approximately 10% lower likelihood of trusting the prime minister. Results are 
robust to the consideration of different types of associations, which are all found to be irrelevant in 
respect to the dependent variable. As for work status, members of professions and farmers are 
significantly more likely to trust the prime minister. 
Another interesting finding is the significant and negative correlation of tolerance towards 
immigrants with our dependent variable. The significance and size of trust in television further 
grows in model 3, the marginal effect now reaching more than 16%. All the other effects remain 
substantially unchanged. 
 
3.1 Endogeneity issues 
As pointed out in section 2, there are two main reasons to suspect the existence of endogeneity 
problems. First, trust in the prime minister and trust in television are individual choices, which 
depend on individual specific and unobservable preferences. Hence, they are by definition 
endogenously determined. Unobservable individual effects such as time preferences, personal 
interests, and individuals’ exogenous shocks may be correlated both with trust in the prime minister 
and trust in TV. Second, there is concern about possible reverse causality: Mr Berlusconi hopes his 
citizens trust his television channels and continuously invites them to do so. Thus, it is likely that 
people can trust television as a consequence of their trust towards the prime minister.  
First, we run a regression-based test endogeneity of trust in television. If the test fails to reject 
absence of endogeneity, we can go back and use the probit model (2) to estimate the effect of trust 
in TV. Otherwise, we are prompted to address endogeneity through IV estimates.   
To derive the regression-based test, a two stage procedure is used. The first-stage reduced form 
regression has trust in television as dependent variable and all the exogenous variables as regressors 
(i.e. the instrumental variables and all exogenous variables included in model 2). As explained in 
section 2, the instruments for trust in television are the quality of friendships and trust in the press. 
At the second-stage, we regress trust in the prime minister on the predicted OLS residuals from the 
                                                 
13 We do not report estimates including all educational qualification dummies in order not to overload tables. Estimates 
are available upon request to the author.  
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first-stage, on the potential endogenous variable (trust in television), and on all the exogenous 
variables. A standard t test on the predicted residuals is our test for endogeneity. The test cannot 
reject the presence of endogeneity (t = 17.61, P > |t| = 0.000), hence we address endogeneity 
through instrumental variables (IV) estimates14. 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects of trust in television in the second stage of the IV estimates, 
along with diagnostic tests of the validity of our instrumental variable estimators. In column 1 we 
report results of IV probit estimates. The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test of over-identifying restrictions 
does not lead us to reject the orthogonality of our instruments with respect to the disturbance term 
of the trust equation with a p-value greater than 0.75.  
As robustness checks, in columns 2 and 3 we report the results of OLS and GMM estimates. The 
Sargan test and the Basmann test of over-identifying restrictions reported in column 2do not lead us 
to reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated 
with the error term, and that they are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, with a p-value 
≅  0.74.  
 
 
Table 3. IV estimates with dichotomous endogenous variable 
 Probit OLS GMM 
 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect. 
t stat. 
Trust in television .1877695 3.39 .1794878 2.95 .1798147 3.07 
Instrumental variables diagnostics    
Test of over-identifying restrictions: 
Statistic (p-value) 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey 
test 
 chi-sq (1) = 0.094   
(0.7597) 
Sargan test  
chi-sq (1) = 0.114 
(0.7352) 
Basmann test 
chi-sq (1) = 0.108   
(0.7419) 
Hansen test 
chi-sq (1) = 0.112 
(0.73821) 
Joint significance coefficient 
chi-sq (1) =  189.87 
(0.000) 
F = 140.30 
(0.000) 
F = 138.77 
(0.000) 
 
 
In column 3, we report the Hansen-Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions15. Once again, the 
test does not lead us to reject the null with a p-value ≅  0.74.  
In columns 2 and 3, the F-statistics, testing the hypothesis that the coefficient of the excluded 
instruments are all zero in each first-stage estimate, are well above the threshold of 10 suggested by 
the literature as the rule of thumb criterion of instrument weakness. Taken together with the non-
rejection of the tests of over-identification, this suggests that our set of instruments is reasonable.  
Overall, when we address the endogeneity of trust in television in IV estimates, we find a slight 
increase in its marginal effect, which now grows to about 17-18%. Trust in TV remains the best 
predictor of trust in the prime minister. Its significance, sign and size remain unchanged in the three 
models.  
In summary, the instrumental variable results confirm the role of trust in television as presented in 
Table 2. 
As a further robustness check, we report in Table 4 results of IV estimates performed that treat the 
endogenous variable as an ordinal, i.e. measured on the original 10 points-scale. The upper part of 
the table contains the marginal effects of trust in television on trust in the prime minister, while the 
                                                 
14Estimates are available upon request to the author.  
15 For the 2SLS estimator, the test statistic is Sargan’s statistic. Under the assumption of conditional homoskedasticity, 
Hansen’s J statistic becomes Sargan’s statistic. The J statistic is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity; 
Sargan's statistic is not (Baum et al. 2007; Wooldridge 2002) 
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lower part reports the same diagnostic tests described with reference to Table 3. As expected, there 
is a decrease in the marginal effect.  
 
Table 4. IV estimates with ordinal endogenous variable 
 Probit OLS GMM 
 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect 
t stat. 
Marginal 
effect. 
t stat. 
Trust in television .1546698       3.02    .0436048 3.01 .0409883 3.08 
Instrumental variables diagnostics    
Test of over-identifying restrictions: 
Statistic (p-value) 
Amemiya-Lee-Newey 
test 
 chi-sq (1) = 0.053   
(0.8177) 
Sargan test  
chi-sq (1) = 0.043   
(0.8348) 
Basmann test 
chi-sq (1) = 0.041   
(0.8391) 
Hansen test 
chi-sq (1) = 0.023 
(0.88016) 
Joint significance coefficient 
chi-sq (1) =   
(0.000) 
F = 174.39 
(0.000) 
F = 172.42 
(0.000) 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
Empirical studies in social psychology have provided some evidence that people vote for politicians 
whose traits they rate as being most similar to their own (Caprara et al. 2002; Caprara et al. 2007). 
This view is often invoked with reference to the Italian political debate, where commentators claim 
that the main reason of Mr Berlusconi’s political success is that people feel a deep affinity with him. 
This argument is hardly questionable per se, in view of the exceptional consensus which the Italian 
prime minister has enjoyed for about 20 years. The objective of this paper is rather to investigate 
how this consensus was formed and kept despite the never-ending series of scandals in which Mr 
Berlusconi has been involved. In other words, we try to improve our understanding of whether the 
Italian media, specifically the television, allow public opinion to be formed in an objective and 
impartial way. Not surprisingly, centre-right political commentators argue that television does not 
exert any particular bias on public opinion. More surprisingly, this view seems to have been shared 
in the last 20 years by all centre-left coalitions, who never proposed a law to regulate Mr 
Berlusconi’s huge conflict of interest. If the assumption of television’s irrelevance were  true, one 
could reasonably expect to find no significant relationship between trust in TV and trust in the 
Italian prime minister. Contrary to this hypothesis, our empirical analysis shows that trust in 
television is the strongest predictor of trust in the Italian prime minister, thus suggesting that Mr 
Berlusconi’s media empire plays a key role in the building of his political consensus.  
This result passes all robustness checks and holds in IV estimates. It must be remarked that the 
cross-sectional design of the research dictates caution in the interpretation of correlations as causal 
relationships. Moreover, we could not control for a series of phenomena which could potentially 
influence both the dependent variable and trust in television (e.g. trust in other information 
channels, such as the Internet). Nonetheless, this paper contributes to the literature by carrying out 
the first econometric investigation into the role of television in steering political consensus, with a 
special focus on trust towards the Italian prime minister. To our knowledge, despite its economic 
relevance this topic is neglected in the literature. We hope our work has a ripple effect in 
stimulating further research on political representatives’ conflicts of interest in the media sector.  
The policy implications of the study are so straightforward that may look obvious, at least in most 
Western democracies. A regulation of conflicts of interest should be a primary objective in the 
political agenda of every democratic government, independent of its political colour. Democracy 
has been defined in various ways by philosophers and political scientists. But whatever definition is 
used, there is no doubt that to qualify as a democracy a regime must allow the selection of the 
leadership and the formulation of general rules as a result of popular decisions, which are based on 
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a public consensus of citizens. A democracy requires that this consensus must be formed freely, 
without manipulation by anyone who has the power to control the mass media.  
Conflicts of interest are not a problem peculiar to the present Italian system, but one of the 
unavoidable issues of democratic theory to which all democratic systems have brought a response. 
Thus, promoting a set of rules to regulatethe conflicts of interest of political representatives is not a 
partisan demand based on the desire to attack one specific leader. Rather, it is a necessary step to 
allow democracy to work properly.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Preferences for Mr Berlusconi’s party and the centre-right coalition in the last three ballotings 
Election 
Mr Berlusconi’s party  
(People of Freedom) 
Centre-right coalition 
European Parliament election 2009 
(National data in brackets) 
26.29 
(35.26) 
43.22 
(45.46) 
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies 2008.  
(National data in brackets) 
27.44 
(37.39) 
46.62 
(46.81) 
Local administration election 2008 12.27 37.87 
 
 
Table A2. Description of variables 
 
Trust in the Italian prime minister 
1-10 points respondents’ score to the question “Do you 
think that the prime minister can be trusted?” Responses 
equal to 6 and above are coded 1. 
Trust in television 
1-10 points respondents’ score to the question “Do you 
think that television can be trusted?” Responses above the 
mean value are coded 1. 
Membership in associations 
Membership in associations; 1 = the interviewee is 
member and/or participates in the activities of one or 
more associations. 
Number of associations 
Number of associations to which the interviewee 
participates. 
Volunteer unpaid work for associations 
Binary variable = 1 if the interviewee has done unpaid 
volunteer work for associations in the last 12 months 
before the interview. 
Help to strangers within volunteering activities 
Binary variable = 1 if the interviewee has concretely 
helped strangers in the last 12 months before the 
interview. 
Participation in associational meetings 
Binary variable = 1 if the interviewee has joined meetings 
of voluntary association sin the last 12 months before the 
interview.  
Social trust 
Trust towards strangers, given by the 10 points 
respondents’ score to the question “Generally speaking, 
do you think that most people can be trusted?”; 1 = values 
above the mean. 
Trust in the judicial system 
Trust towards the judicial system, given by the 10 points 
respondents’ score to the question “Do you think that the 
judicial system can be trusted?”. 1 = values above the 
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mean. 
Tolerance towards non EU immigrants 
Tolerance towards non EU immigrants, as given by 1-5 
respondents’ score to the question: “Would you be 
willing to have non EU immigrants as neighbours?”, 1 
meaning “Totally unfavourable”, 3 meaning 
“Indifferent”, 5 meaning “Totally favourable”. Binary 
variable = 1 if interviewee is willing or indifferent to 
have non EU immigrants as neighbours.  
Tolerance towards EU immigrants 
Tolerance towards EU immigrants, as given by 1-5 
respondents’ score to the question: “Would you be 
willing to have EU immigrants as neighbours?”, 1 
meaning “Totally unfavourable”, 3 meaning 
“Indifferent”, 5 meaning “Totally favourable”. Binary 
variable = 1 if interviewee is willing or indifferent to 
have EU immigrants as neighbours. 
Tolerance towards drug or alcohol addicts 
Tolerance towards non drug and alcohol addicts, as given 
by 1-5 respondents’ score to the question: “Would you be 
willing to have drug and alcohol addicts as neighbours?”, 
1 meaning “Totally unfavourable”, 3 meaning 
“Indifferent”, 5 meaning “Totally favourable”. Binary 
variable = 1 if interviewee is willing or indifferent to 
have towards drug or alcohol addicts as neighbours. 
Age 35-49 Age of the respondent; 1 = age between 35 and 49 
Age 50-64 Age of the respondent; 1 = age between 50 and 64 
Age 65 and more Age of the respondent; 1 = age 65 and more 
Female 1 = female 
Being in a stable relationship 
1 = the respondent is in a stable relationship, including 
marriage 
Educational qualification (ordinal) 
Ordinal variable assuming the following values; 1 = no 
educational qualification; 2 = elementary school (5 
years); 3 = junior high school (8 years); 4 = high school 
(13 years); 5 = university degree and/or doctorate (18 
years and more). 
Precarious worker 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is a precarious 
worker with a temporary or no contract of employment. 
Blue-collar worker 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is blue-collar 
worker with permanent contract of employment. 
Office worker 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is office worker 
with permanent contract of employment. 
Teacher 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is teacher with 
permanent contract of employment. 
Managerial employee 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent managerial 
employee with permanent contract of employment 
(includes college teachers, magistrates, university 
researchers). 
Member of professions 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is member of 
professions. 
Entrepreneur Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is entrepreneur. 
Farmer Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is farmer. 
Unemployed Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is unemployed. 
Retired Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is retired. 
Homemaker Binary variable = 1 if the respondent is homemaker. 
Area or residence (urban vs. rural) 
Binary variable = 1 if the respondent lives in a urban 
area. 
Poor 
Indicator of economic well-being given by responses to 
the question: “Is your household’s income sufficient to 
see you through to the end of the month?”. Respondents 
were asked to give a score from 1 to 5, with 1 meaning 
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“With great difficulty” and 5 meaning “Very easily”. 
Binary variable = 1 for negative responses (i.e. “With 
great difficulty” and “With difficulty”) 
Quality of friendships 
Subjective assessment of satisfaction with relationships 
with friends; 1 = values above the mean 
Trust in the press 
1-10 points respondents’ score to the question “Do you 
think that the press can be trusted?” Responses above the 
mean value are coded 1. 
 
